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This memorandum explores the question whether regulation in telecommunications encourages 
or hampers the development of new technologies. Contrary to other network industries, the 
telecommunications industry is more and more characterized by several, competing networks, 
such as cable, copper, and wireless. Regulation is, however, still needed as in several 
components of telecommunications sources of market power remain. The key issue in the 
regulation of access to a network is dealing with the possible trade-off between static efficiency 
and dynamic efficiency. Favourable conditions for access to the network contribute to allocative 
efficiency and productive efficiency, but can negatively affect incentives for investments in 
upgrading of existing infrastructures and developing new ones.  
  In the Netherlands, regulation of the telecommunication industry is designed to 
enhance competition between alternative infrastructures without affecting the technology choice 
of both incumbents and entrants. In the market for unbundled access to the local loop and the 
market for high quality wholesale access, a trade-off exists between static efficiency and 
dynamic efficiency. Regulated access tariffs, which are based on average costs, seem to be a 
good compromise between static and dynamic efficiency. Tariffs for access to the local loop 
reflect actual costs of the existing copper infrastructure, giving entrants incentives to make 
efficient make-or-buy decisions. In addition, the threat of infrastructure competition in the local 
loop, as well as the service-based competition between providers using different infrastructures, 
i.e. copper and cable, provide incentives for the incumbent to increase efficiency. Our overall 
conclusion is that Dutch regulation of the telecommunication industry gives efficient incentives 
for technological developments such as the deployment of broadband. 
 
1 This memorandum is written as a part of a project on broadband policies (see CPB, 2005). The authors of this 
memorandum benefited from discussions with the other members of the project team, i.e. Bert Minne and Henry van der 
Wiel (both CPB) and Joost Poort (SEO). In addition, they thank Jonas Rozenstok and his colleagues at the OPTA for their  
comments on draft versions of this memorandum. Of course, the usual disclaimer applies. 
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1  Introduction 
This memorandum explores the relationship between regulation of the telecommunications 
industry and the deployment of broadband. According to the International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU), regulation is a key factor for broadband competition (ITU, 2003). Effective 
regulation encourages competition on existing infrastructures and reduces barriers to rolling out 
new infrastructures. A study by The Allen Consulting group, modelling the economic impact of 
broadband infrastructure for specific regions in Australia, concludes that the regional economic 
effects of an open network are almost 20% higher compared to a vertically integrated service 
provider (ACG, 2003). 
 
Our exploration of the relationship between regulation and the deployment of broadband 
focuses on the impact of regulation on investments in technological improvements. Moreover, 
the focus of the analysis is on the Netherlands, although attention will be given to experiences 
in other countries. Although the market for broadband includes both broadband infrastructure 
and content and application services, we will only zoom in on infrastructure. As we will show, 
market failures, and hence regulation dealing with them, are clearly present in communications 
infrastructures, whereas they are virtually absent in content and application services.
2 The key 
question of this memorandum is therefore: to which extent does regulation of the 
telecommunication industry affect investments in new communications infrastructures in the 
Netherlands? 
 
This memorandum starts with a concise description of the main characteristics of 
telecommunications as a network industry, potential market failures following from it and the 
relationship between market power on the one hand and static and dynamic efficiency on the 
other (section 2). These characteristics, market failures and relationships influence policy 
options which governments have in order to improve performance of the telecommunication 
industry. Section 3 describes the main issues of regulation and competition policy regarding this 
industry. Section 4 offers an overview of access regulations in different countries around the 
globe, such as South Korea, Canada and Sweden, whereas section 5 focuses on regulation in the 
Netherlands. Section 6 addresses the key issue of this memorandum: the relationship between 
regulation and broadband in the Netherlands. Section 7 summarises the conclusions. 
 
2 See CPB (2005) for an elaboration on these services.   3 
2  The need for regulation in telecommunications 
2.1  Telecommunications as a network industry 
The telecommunications industry is traditionally viewed as a network industry, like energy and 
railways. Network industries have three fundamental, mutually-related characteristics which 
make them different from other sectors (CPB, 2004). These characteristics are  
·  the presence of network infrastructures  
·  which form essential links in the related chain of activities, and  
·  which coincide with substantial economies of scale. 
 
In the next sections, we will focus on the telecommunications industry and concisely elaborate 
on each of the above characteristics. 
 
2.1.1  Presence of network infrastructure 
Telecommunication infrastructure sometimes gives rise to network externalities. From the 
perspective of consumers, network externalities occur if “one person’s utility for a good 
depends on the number of other people who consume this good” (Varian, 2003). This holds in 
particular for the telecommunications industry, where each newly connected consumer raises 
the value of the system to consumers already present. Due to the positive effect on total value, 
this network externality is viewed to be positive. Besides network externalities, consumption 
externalities may arise too. Negative consumption externalities arise, for instance, in the 
electricity industry if aggregated demand, resulting from many individual decisions made by 
consumers, raises the load of the system so much that supply is unable to follow and, hence, 
brown-outs or even black-outs result. In telecommunication negative externalities arise as an 
excessively high consumption level of one user negatively affects the speed or quality of the 
telecommunication services available to the others. All these externalities follow directly from 
individual behaviour. 
 
Another typical characteristic of a network infrastructure are increasing returns to scale and 
scope in network size: “a greater number of complementary products can be supplied - and at a 
lower price - when the network grows.” (Tirole, 1988). This also applies to the development of 
the network: the more developed a network is, the cheaper extending the network generally is. 
In a well-developed railway system for instance, or an electricity grid or natural-gas network, 
extending the system to more locations within the same area incurs relatively low costs due to 
the small distances which have to be covered.   4 
2.1.2  Essential facility 
The network infrastructure forms an essential facility in the industry meaning that the 
infrastructure is a necessary input for activities of sectors using the infrastructure and the 
infrastructure cannot (economically or technically) be duplicated by competitors (Worldbank, 
2000). Train operators absolutely need tracks to offer their transport services, just as electricity 
producers need wires to transport power, and suppliers of telecommunication services need an 
infrastructure such as local loops, support structures as poles and conduits, telephone numbers 
or frequency spectrum.  
 
The essential character of a facility depends, however, on the perspective from which a sector is 
viewed. In the gas industry, for instance, gas producers could develop alternative ways, notably 
liquefying, to transport gas if pipelines have not been developed. A rail operator could use other 
means of transport, such as busses, if tracks are not available on certain distances. In the 
telecommunication industry, technological developments have brought forward several 
alternative techniques for telecommunication, making one specific technique less essential. Due 
to the digitalization of information, existing cable and (mobile) telephone networks are more 
and more able to perform the same functions. This implies that none of the existing networks 
can be deemed essential, although some parts of existing networks are still essential, such as the 
local loop of copper lines in many countries. It depends on the sustainability of the current 
market structure (i.e. can several networks continue to coexist?) as well as the future demand 
for telecommunication services (i.e. will the current networks become technologically 
obsolete?) to which extent a telecommunication network remains an essential facility in a 
specific market and region. 
 
Strongly related to the essential-facility character of networks is the high level of 
interdependence between users of infrastructure, i.e., in the case of telecommunications, the 
producers and consumers of content and the service providers. Consequently, use of the 
infrastructure requires much coordination in order to prevent accidents on the tracks, black outs 
in the supply of power or disturbances in telecommunication services. Moreover, the closely 
links between infrastructure activities and operational activities could cause economies of 
scope, i.e. integrating these activities in one firm could be more efficient than conducting these 
activities in separate firms.  
2.1.3  Economies of scale 
Network industries coincide with significant economies of scale due to the high level of fixed 
costs and (very) low marginal costs. If investments in a network infrastructure have been made, 
these costs are mainly sunk, i.e. these costs can not be recovered. The huge fixed costs and the   5 
scale effects related to it make it uneconomical to double networks in most countries. As a 
consequence, networks are often natural monopolies. 
 
Whether or not a telecommunication network is a natural monopoly ultimately depends on the 
level of fixed costs relative to demand. Interestingly, both fixed costs and demand have been 
subject to substantial change over the last ten to fifteen years in such a way that a monopoly has 
become less ‘natural’. Consider, for instance, the market for telephony. This market used to be a 
clear example of a natural monopoly. The fixed costs of setting up a telephone network were so 
high that only one network could be economically exploited. However, the introduction of the 
GSM standard gave rise to an alternative technology with much lower fixed costs. There are 
still economies of scale, but generally the market for telephony is no longer regarded as a 
natural monopoly nowadays. 
 
Lower fixed costs thus decrease the tendency to natural monopolies. But the same applies to a 
higher demand. As mentioned, due to digitalization of content the existing cable and telephone 
networks can nowadays perform similar communication services. Together with the increased 
demand for telecommunication in general, this implies that the economic value of these 
networks has increased. Hence, the ratio of fixed cost relative to demand for a given network 
has considerably improved. It is unclear how many competing networks could co-exist, but to 
have only one supplier of a fixed telecommunication network has become less ‘natural’. 
2.2  Market failures in telecommunications 
The characteristics of network industries give rise to several potential market failures. The most 
important one of these market failures is the existence of market power. Other potential market 
failures are the existence of externalities, the hold-up of investments and information 
asymmetry. In this memorandum, we focus on market power as this market failure forms the 
background behind regulation of the telecommunication industry.
3  
 
The presence of network externalities and economies of scale in the provision of essential 
facilities gives advantages to the (incumbent) firms. These advantages, which were enhanced by 
legal arrangements giving incumbent firms dominant positions in the industry, include the 
following (Worldbank, 2000):  
·  Control of essential facilities; 
 
3 CPB (2005) gives an analysis of the significance of all potential market failures in the telecommunications industry, in 
particular in relationship to the deployment of broadband.  
   6 
·  Economies of established national networks which cannot be matched by new entrants for many 
years; 
·  Vertical economies, i.e. economies of vertically integrated production facilities, such as local 
access networks, national long-distance networks, and international networks; 
·  Control over network standards and development; 
·  Cross-subsidies, e.g. of local access services by international services as occurred in many 
countries; 
·  Customer inertia resulting in switching costs, including both specific expenses, such as 
purchases of new telephones, modems or decoders, and inconveniences caused by, for instance, 
dialling extra digits and dealing with two telephone bills.  
 
The dominant position following from these advantages gives the unregulated incumbent 
several options for strategic behaviour in order to raise its own profits. According to the 
Telecommunications Regulation Handbook (Worldbank, 2000), a dominant 
telecommunications operator can increase its profits by: 
·  Refusing or delaying essential facilities to competitors; 
·  Providing services or facilities to competitors on discriminatory terms or at excessive prices 
leading to allocative inefficiencies as these prices exceed marginal costs and, hence reduce the 
level of consumption; 
·  Predatory pricing or cross-subsidization of competitive services with revenues from network 
services; 
·  Bundling of services on competitive markets with services related to essential facilities; 
·  Increasing switching costs by actions to “lock-in” customers. 
 
2.3  Market power and efficiency 
2.3.1  Static and dynamic efficiency 
The objective of policies directed at market power is to increase efficiency. Economic 
efficiency can be viewed at from two perspectives: static and dynamic. Static efficiency is 
maximized under two conditions. First the sum of consumer and producer surplus should be 
maximized. This condition is called allocative efficiency, and it is achieved when goods are 
priced according to their marginal costs.
4 The second condition, labelled productive efficiency, 
states that production should take place at the lowest possible costs (given all available 
technologies). If the second condition does not hold, so called x-inefficiencies exist. 
 
 
4 Perfect price discrimination, where every consumer pays according to his maximum willingness to pay, also maximizes the 
sum of consumer and producer surplus.   7 
Dynamic efficiency refers to the present value of the future stream of static total welfare. The 
development of product innovations that increase consumer surplus, or process innovations that 
lead to smaller production costs, enhance dynamic efficiency. However, maximizing dynamic 
efficiency is not the same as maximizing static efficiency in every period, because under some 
circumstances dynamic efficiency requires conditions that adversely affect static efficiency. If 
innovation requires large investments, high post-innovation profits are needed to recover the 
costs of innovation. 
2.3.2  Trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency in telecommunications 
Strategic behaviour by firms resulting from their market power generally reduces social welfare 
due to price distortions. But besides this adverse impact of market power on static efficiency, 
dynamic efficiency might also be affected by market power. Theoretically, this relationship is, 
however, not clear. Too little competition could reduce the incentives to innovate, because the 
‘reward’ for an innovating monopolist is generally smaller than the reward for a competitive 
firm. Loosely speaking: the monopolist is already enjoying monopoly profits
5, whereas a 
competitive firm has the opportunity to escape from competition by innovating, resulting in 
monopoly profits. However, if the innovation is easily imitated, these monopoly profits will 
merely be temporary. Other firms will simply copy the innovation, making the innovator lose its 
competitive advantage. When the innovator knows this in advance, it will have much smaller 
incentives to invest in innovative activities. Therefore, the presence of too many competitors 
that can easily imitate an innovation reduces the incentives to innovate. 
 
In conclusion, in theory market power may enhance dynamic efficiency, but it may also reduce 
it. Or, put differently: there could be a trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency, but they 
can also go hand in hand. Empirical research, however, appears to be less ambiguous. An 
overview by Canton (2002) suggests that in most industries competition is found to be 
conducive to dynamic efficiency. The synthesis of theory and empirics presented in this paper 
mentions a number of conditions in an industry that result in a trade-off between static and 
dynamic efficiency. These conditions are: 
 
·  High research and development expenditures: as these costs are largely sunk, post-innovation 
profits (i.e., low static efficiency) are needed to recover the costs. 
·  Low marginal costs: if marginal cost are low (relative to fixed costs), average costs are 
declining over a large range of output. Scale economies result, implying a large market share 
and high price-cost margins for a firm. These (statically inefficient) prospects are conducive to 
innovation, as earning back the cost of innovation is relatively easy. 
 
5 Arrow (1962) has labeled this the replacement effect: the monopolist replaces himself at a slightly higher profit level.   8 
·  High technological and commercial uncertainty: again, high post-innovation profits are needed 
to overcome these uncertainties. 
·  Network effects: if these are present, being the first to innovate will be highly profitable. The 
propensity to innovate is therefore high, but after the innovation the winner will obtain a large 
and stable market share. 
·  Highly fluctuating market shares: this condition states that it is actually possible to take over the 
market due to a successful innovation. 
 
Summarizing, Canton (2002) states that static inefficiencies due to market power can coincide 
with dynamic efficiency if the industry is characterized by high costs of research and 
development, substantial economies of scale and high technological or commercial uncertainty. 
Put differently: if the sunk costs of innovating are high, excess profits are required in order to 
undertake the innovative activities. Excess profits, in turn, require market power, which can be 
found in markets where scale economies and network effects prevail. 
 
How does this apply to the telecommunications industry? As telecommunications is not a 
typical knowledge-intensive industry (such as pharmaceutics), spending on research and 
development is not very high. Telecommunication is predominantly capital-intensive, and 
technological advances in capital are typically developed outside the telecom industry (by 
manufacturers of telecommunication and network equipment). Still, the costs of introducing an 
innovation, particularly if it concerns the roll out of a new network, are high and largely sunk.  
 
Will a telecom firm be able to recoup the costs of innovation? This depends on the 
appropriability of profits associated with the innovation: can a firm that introduces some new 
innovation or increase in infrastructure quality appropriate sufficient gain before its competitors 
are able to imitate and reduce the benefit to unprofitable levels (Bennett et al., 2001)? The costs 
associated with switching from one infrastructure provider to another are certainly helpful in 
this respect. These switching costs actually grant some monopoly power to the innovator. If 
switching costs are smaller than the benefit from switching from the existing infrastructure to 
the new infrastructure, but larger than the gain from switching from one new infrastructure to 
another, an innovator will be able to recover the cost related to the innovation or upgrade of its 
infrastructure. 
 
This reasoning supports the evidence for a trade-off: switching costs, whilst bad for static 
efficiency, are conducive to investments in more advanced infrastructure that are characterised   9 
by high fixed costs.
6 Furthermore, marginal costs are low (i.e., scale economies are substantial), 
network effects are clearly present and, in particular commercial uncertainty appears to be high 
as well.
7 Only highly fluctuating market shares are not observed in telecommunications, partly 
due to switching costs, but also due to the relatively short period of market liberalization. 
Nevertheless, scale economies, network effects and switching costs give telecom firms some 
degree of market power. If a telco is successful, it will, at least for some time, be rewarded by 
monopoly-like profits. Given the high costs of introducing innovations in infrastructure, these 
profits are highly conducive to undertake innovative activities in telecommunications. Static 
and dynamic efficiency hence do not seem to go hand in hand in the telecommunication 
industry. 
 
Further evidence for the existence of the trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency may 
come from indicators that reflect the present level of static and dynamic efficiency of the 
telecom industry. Although static and dynamic efficiency are hard to measure, the following 
variables can be used for this. For static efficiency, one could e.g. look at demand side 
substitutability (to what extent is it possible for customers to substitute other services for those 
in question) and supply side substitutability (to what extent can suppliers switch, or increase, 
production to supply the relevant products or services), the number of suppliers and the level of 
switching costs. Dynamic efficiency can be approximated by the number of product and process 
innovations, a larger set of choices for consumers and improvements in quality and services. If 
one finds that telecom is statically inefficient but dynamically efficient, or vice versa, this 
would further support the evidence for a trade-off. 
 
Naturally, the size and significance of the trade-off, as well as the present location on this trade-
off, matters a lot for policy. We will come back to this issue in chapter 6, where we discuss the 
effects of Dutch regulation on the deployment of broadband. But first we will describe the main 
general issues regarding regulation and competition policy in telecommunications. 
3  Policies for the telecommunication industry 
3.1  Regulation and competition policy 
In order to solve the above (potential) market failures in the market for telecommunication, 
governments have several policy options to intervene in the industry. In the past, state 
 
6 Hausman (1997) shows that neglecting the irreversibility of these investments has led the Federal Communication 
Commission in the US to focus too much on static cost efficiency. As such, the FCC “...has failed to account for the 
demonstrated large gains in dynamic economic efficiency that arise from new investment.” Hausman (1997, p. 36). 
7 Most telecom firms have fully depreciated the huge amounts they have paid for UMTS-licenses in only a few years. 
Apparently they have all greatly overestimated the value of these licenses.   10 
ownership was a common choice to influence, i.e. to determine, the behaviour of network firms. 
This solution enabled public-owned firms, among others, to set prices at marginal-cost level as 
public authorities gave lump-sum subsidies to cover fixed costs. Although this option 
theoretically solves the issue of allocative efficiency, it generally scores less on the issue of 
productive and dynamic efficiency because of the lack of incentives for management to 
improve productivity and to increase innovation.  
 
Because of the unsatisfactory performance of the public-owned monopolists in the 
telecommunication industry, governments started a process of liberalization and privatization in 
the European countries in the 1990s. Simultaneously, economic regulation and competition 
policy were introduced in order to establish competitive markets and solve competition 
problems. Economic regulation is directed at designing competitive markets, e.g. by proscribing 
conditions for network access, while competition policies focuses at preventing and curbing 
abuses of market power (Worldbank, 2000). Regulation and competition policies are strongly 
mutually related.
8 
3.1.1  Regulation 
Regulation (in the broad sense) has to ensure that network operators do not abuse market power 
resulting from the natural monopoly of the network. Regulatory measures include both 
structural measures and behavioural measures. The former affects the legal and ownership 
structure as well as the vertical and horizontal organization of the industry, while the latter 
focuses at changing the incentives of players in the industry. Behavioural measures include 
access regulation, notably negotiated or regulated third-party access, price regulation (e.g. caps 
on the prices the dominant firm may demand) and quality regulation.  
 
Consistency in regulation is an important issue. A private firm that plans to invest in a new 
broadband telecommunication network will take into account that, in case its network becomes 
an essential facility, it will be subject to policy measures (notably access and price regulation). 
Too much uncertainty about future regulation will adversely affect welfare if it makes firms 
refrain from otherwise welfare enhancing investments. Under adaptive expectations, this 
implies that current regulation should not give rise to uncertainty. 
3.1.2  Competition policy 
Competition policy is directed at conditions, other than access tariffs, affecting entrance of new 
players to the local loop, and, more generally, competition within this industry. The need for 
 
8 The need for sector-specific regulation of the telecommunications industry is declining due to the growing competition 
within this industry. According to several authors, the industry eventually will only be subject to general competition policy 
(see e.g. De Ru, 2004). The question is, however, in which pace this development is emerging.   11 
this policy follows from the options the owner of the network has to hinder competitors, which 
can be summarized under the heading 3D: deny, delay and detail. An unregulated owner of the 
local loop could, for instance, impede access to the local loop by referring to shortage of space 
for co-location at the main distribution frames. Other examples of anti-competitive behaviour 
are discriminatory use or withholding of information, strategic designs of products, bundling, 
predatory pricing and tacit collusion.
9 In the remaining of this memorandum we focus on 
regulation issues. 
3.2  Regulation of access 
3.2.1  Key issues 
Introduction of competition in a network industry, such as telecommunications, requires 
adequate regulation of access to network components which cannot easily be duplicated. In the 
case of a vertically-integrated firm, both parts of this firm, i.e. the network part and the service 
provision, usually are closely interwoven. As a result, a vertically-integrated firm has strong 
incentives to hinder downstream competitors (see above under the heading “market power”). 
Consequently, key issues in the regulation of networks are the accessibility to the network of 
upstream or downstream commercial firms, the tariffs network firms may demand for the use of 
the network and the investments by network owners in maintaining and extending the network.  
3.2.2  Unbundling 
In order to reduce the options for a firm to hinder competition and to increase the power of the 
regulator to effectively intervene in the market, unbundling is a regulatory measure generally 
applied in network industries. After all, proper third-party access to network can only be 
realized if network activities are conducted independently from competitive activities. 
However, separation can incur significant costs due to economies of scope between network 
management and service provision. The choice of the degree of unbundling, such as accounting 
unbundling, legal unbundling or ownership unbundling, is not the same across industries and 
may also depend on characteristics of the country. “As experience mounts with weaker forms of 
separation, a movement can be discerned, especially in certain sectors, towards stronger and 
more effective forms of separation.” (OECD, 2001.) 
 
In telecommunication, separation of the local loop from competitive services appears to be 
problematic. Separation undermines incentives for efficient investment in the local loop, as it is 
 
9 See ERG (2004) for a systematic overview of competition problems and remedies. The past has shown several examples 
of this kind of practices in the Netherlands resulting in actions by the regulator (see website of the regulator for an overview 
of disputes: www.opta.nl). In the more recent past, less of such events have happened suggesting that the regulator 
together with the competition authority (NMA) is improving its effectiveness in dealing with competition restricting behaviour 
in the telecommunication industry.    12 
difficult to contractually arrange that the owner of local loop appropriates returns on his 
investment. Because of the alleged high economies of scope between network management and 
retail, local loop unbundling is usually carried out in a form of access regulation, such that the 
incumbent retains ownership and responsibility for maintenance of the lines which are then 
leased to the rival operator. The OECD (2003) strongly doubts whether ownership unbundling 
in telecommunication would strengthen competition and, hence, reduce prices, while it views 
the costs of full separation significantly high, in particular due to increased problems with 
coordination of investments between network firm and retail firms.
10 Given the growing 
competition among alternative techniques for telecommunication, i.e. copper lines, cable and 
wireless techniques, the networks in this industry cease to be bottlenecks, reducing the need for 
unbundling (De Bijl, 2004). 
3.2.3  Access conditions 
In determining the access condition, the regulator has to deal with the issue of hold-up, i.e. the 
risk the investor in network infrastructure faces regarding future access conditions. Therefore, 
network firms very much need contracts which give them certainty about future access 
conditions in order to deal with the risk of ex post opportunism of users of the infrastructure. 
 
The determination of access tariffs belongs to the key issues of regulating network industries, as 
it is related to allocative efficiency as well as dynamic efficiency (Mason et al. 2001, Canoy et 
al. 2003)
11. Proper regulation of access fees for the infrastructure is needed to give the network 
firm adequate investment incentives without distorting the market for services. However, the 
relationship between access tariffs and (infrastructure) competition is not unambiguous because 
of the existence of two separate dynamics: the impact of access tariffs on entry and the 
mechanism described by the idea of a ladder of investments (Brunel University, 2001). The 
former dynamic requires low access prices in order to encourage entry and, hence, competition 
by entrants.  However, if access prices are below average costs, the network firm does not have 
an incentive to invest in the (new) infrastructure (such as glass fibre). 
 
The second dynamic states that access prices should rise in order to stimulate investments by 
entrants when they are climbing on the ladder of investments. Eventually, access tariffs will 
reach a level at which the (potential) entrant will be indifferent between paying the access 
tariffs for using the local loop of the incumbent and rolling-out its own infrastructure to the end-
 
10 In a cost-benefit analysis of structural separation in telecommunication, OECD (2003) concludes that structural separation 
in this industry is “risky with benefits that seem limited, uncertain, indeed, conjectural, with on the other hand, potentially 
significant costs including potentially adverse effects on network development. Certainly, there is insufficient evidence that 
benefits would be convincingly in excess of costs”.  
11 “Any access price affects operator’s (potential) profits, and hence also their incentives to enter the market, to invest in new 
technologies, to roll out networks, to maintain and upgrade existing networks and so on.” (Canoy, et al., 2003) 
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user. Consequently, the incentive for the incumbent to improve efficiency (and performance) of 
the local loop follows from the threat that entrants will roll-out alternative infrastructures. 
 
If a network firm is integrated with a downstream firm, i.e. a service provider, regulation is 
needed to guarantee access of other downstream firms to the infrastructure in order to realize 
competition in the market for service provision. If other service providers have own networks, 
regulation has to force interconnection of the several networks because of the existence of 
network externalities (see above). Interconnection in telecommunication means that, for 
instance, “a phone call originated in a local loop is carried over the network of other carriers 
both nationally and internationally” (Shy, 2001). Without interconnection, only the largest firm 
would eventually remain (Aalbers, et al., 2002). 
4  Regulation of telecommunication in international 
perspective 
4.1  Introduction 
As was argued above, communication networks generally experience substantial economies of 
scale and network externalities, leading to significant market power or even monopolies. 
Without government intervention, i.e. regulation, this will generally lead to a loss of welfare 
due to high prices. This section gives a concise overview of regulation in the 
telecommunications industry in different countries around the globe, in particular South Korea, 
Canada, and Sweden. These countries have relatively strongly developed broadband markets 
(Wu, 2004). According to OECD (2005) data, the number of broadband subscribers per 100 
inhabitants in these countries in 2004 ranged from 25 (South Korea) to 15 (Sweden). We will 
distinguish three major components of regulation: (state) ownership, structural measures 
(unbundling) and regulation of access conditions. In section 5, we will analyze these matters 
more extensively for the Netherlands. 
4.2  Ownership 
In South-Korea, the former incumbent telecommunication firm, Korea Telecom, is gradually 
privatized in the 1990s which process was finalized in 2002. In spite of the privatization of the 
industry, government still affects its development by means of licensing procedures, imposing 
standards and proscribing the choice of equipment and technologies. Moreover, foreign 
ownership of telecommunication firms is restricted by law to 49% which limits the options for 
foreign firms to invest in South Korea. Contrary to other regions in the world, many countries in   14 
Asia, e.g. India, Indonesia, Philippines and Malaysia, have imposed restrictions on foreign 
ownership (Fink et al., 2001).  
 
Canada also shows significant restrictions on foreign ownership in the telecommunications 
industry (Wu, 2004) as a result of the political ambitions to “to promote the ownership and 
control of Canadian carriers by Canadians” (article 7 of the Telecommunications Act of 1993, 
OECD, 2002). Most telecommunication firms in this country are privately owned (OECD, 
2002). After the introduction of competition, the number of firms increased rapidly making the 
market fairly competitive which benefited the development of technologies, such as broadband 
(OECD, 2002).  
 
In Sweden, the government (still) owns almost 50% of the TeliaSonera which is the result of the 
merger (in 2002) of the Swedish incumbent telecommunications operator (Telia) and the 
Finnish firm Sonera.  Also local authorities have shares in telecommunication firms. For 
instance, the municipality of Stockholm owns the network firm Stokab which has invested in a 
(dark) fibre network in the Stockholm region, consisting of more than 30 towns.
12 The local 
authorities in this region set up Stokab primarily to improve the coordination of digging 
activities and to encourage broadband access for low-income families. Stokab is a wholesaler of 
bandwidth to over 70 service providers, including public authorities and telecommunication 
companies. 
4.3  Unbundling and access tariffs 
All countries mentioned above have imposed legal unbundling of the local loop (Wu, 2004). 
South Korea and Sweden introduced ULL only recently (2002 and 2001, respectively), 
implying that this measure is not a necessary condition for a rapid deployment of broadband as 
that process started before the introduction of ULL in these countries. 
 
In the United States, investments in fibre-to-the-home (Ftth) networks are not subject to 
unbundling if they are additional to existing (copper) local loops (OPTA, 2005b). If the Ftth-
network replaces a local loop (i.e. a brownfield investment) the owner of that network has to 
give access to third parties only for enabling transmission of voice (i.e. 64 Kbps) while the 
remaining capacity of the fibre (above 64 Kbps) is not unbundled. Third-party-access 
obligations are not imposed when an Ftth-network is realized in a region without any existing 
local loop (i.e. a greenfield investment).  
 
 
12 Source “Stokab, city-owned dark-fiber provider, http://www.point-topic.com/content/operatorSource/ profiles/ Sweden/ 
Stokab_brief_050719.htm, 19 July 2005.   15 
 
In Canada, the charges for access to the local loop were initially based on “incremental costs 
plus a 25% mark-up for the recovery of fixed and common costs” (OECD, 2002). As the 
resulting level of the access tariffs appeared to hinder entrants, charges were significantly 
reduced. 
5  Regulation of telecommunication in the Netherlands 
5.1  Introduction 
In the Netherlands, regulation of the telecommunication industry is mainly directed at the local 
copper infrastructure.
13 In the past, this was due to EU legislation which only focused on this 
infrastructure. According to the current EU framework for telecommunication, other 
infrastructures are also subject to regulation if they have dominant positions on markets. As the 
Dutch cable infrastructure has a modest share in the national market for internet access 
(approximately 15%), the regulator decided not to regulate access to this infrastructure (OPTA, 
2005b).
14 The same argument holds for other infrastructures, such as fibre. Due to the relatively 
small market shares, access to these infrastructures is not (yet) regulated. This section, 
therefore, focuses on regulation of the copper infrastructure. 
5.2  Ownership 
The owner of the local loop is KPN, the former state-owned vertically-integrated monopolist. 
For about a decade, KPN has been quoted on the stock exchange. Under influence of the 
European Commission aiming for less government influence in the telecom industry, the State 
has reduced its share in this company. Currently, the Dutch State possesses about 15% of 
KPN.
15 Besides this share in KPN, the State possesses a golden (symbolic) share giving it veto 
rights in strategic decisions regarding KPN, such as mergers and acquisitions. Whether a golden 
share de facto gives the State more influence in the firm is subject to debate. Moreover, 
according to the European Commission this special treatment of the State cannot be maintained. 
Therefore, we conclude that the owner of the Dutch local loop can be viewed as a private party 
pursuing private interests. Regulation of access of essential facilities owned by this party is, 
therefore, required to achieve competitive markets. 
 
13 Currently, broadband is offered through the copper infrastructure by ADSL. 
14 Furthermore, unbundling is practically not feasible in cable networks, where connections are never truly individual. 
15 See press release of ANP-AFX, 19 January 2005.   16 
5.3  Unbundling 
Important components of the economic regulation of the telecommunication industry are 
unbundling of the local loop and access regulation. As clarified before, unbundling is needed in 
order to achieve competition on the market for service provision. In the Netherlands and in 
other countries of the European Union, the local loop has been unbundled for several years now 
after it has been made compulsory by the European Union (EU, 2000). Unbundling of the local 
loop (ULL) means that other firms have access to the main distribution frames (MDF) and to 
local exchanges within the local loop. Unbundling enables entrants to offer broadband access 
(in case of partial unbundling by line sharing) or broadband access as well as telephone services 
(in case of full unbundling) without rolling-out a complete infrastructure immediately. 
 
Contrary to several other European countries, owners of backbones (i.e. the long-distance 
infrastructure) are not obliged to give access to this infrastructure (what is called bitstream 
access).
16 Although the regulator initially intended to proscribe bitstream access in order to 
foster competition, several legal procedures between OPTA and a firm demanding bitstream 
access (Tiscali) against KPN resulted in the judicial decision that the then prevailing 
Telecommunication law did not provide a legal base for bitstream unbundling (Steenbruggen, 
2004). Consequently, potential competitors in the Netherlands needed to invest in own 
backbones in order to reach end-users. According to its latest annual report, the regulator 
(OPTA) views the different treatment of local loop and bitstream as beneficial for the 
development of facility-based competition (OPTA, 2005). 
5.4  Access tariffs 
The wholesale-access tariffs (for using the ULL of KPN) are regulated. In the early stages of 
ULL, the regulator (OPTA) based these tariffs on historical costs including a return on capital. 
The regulator planned to start with relatively low tariff levels and to raise the levels after a 
number of years (see e.g. Van Eijk, 1999). The initially low levels should attract new players to 
the new market while raising the tariffs should give sufficient incentives to both the network 
owner to invest in its network and to competitors to develop alternative infrastructures.  
 
Under influence of several legal disputes, the method of cost allocation gradually changed. 
Currently, wholesale-access tariffs are based on actual costs (also called embedded direct costs). 
OPTA motivates the choice for this method by the mechanism described earlier, where the 
(potential) entrant faces a ‘make-or-buy’ decision, which, in turn, motivates the incumbent to 
improve efficiency (and performance) of the local loop. 
 
16 As we will explain later, this does not apply to the market for high quality wholesale access.   17 
 
As a matter of fact, access tariffs have declined since the start of access regulation. For instance, 
according to a memorandum of the regulator, KPN has proposed to reduce (one-off as well as 
periodic) 2004/2005 tariffs for access to the main distribution frames and for line sharing by 3 
to 15% (OPTAa, 2004). As the access tariffs are cost based, this decrease is due to efficiency 
improvements in the management of the local loop. It is not unlikely that, given the growing 
competition within the industry, the access tariffs will be less strongly regulated in the future, 
giving the owner of the local loop more freedom to determine tariffs (see e.g. De Ru, 2004). 
6  Dutch regulation and the deployment of broadband 
6.1  Relevant markets in broadband and efficiency 
This section discusses how the Dutch regulator of the telecom industry (OPTA) has dealt with 
the possible trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency. In particular, this sections analyses 
to which extent the regulation of the telecom industry has affected deployment of broadband in 
the past and explores the impact of current regulation on future deployment of broadband in the 
Netherlands. 
 
Since the impact of regulation on dynamic efficiency depends on both the strength and nature of 
the trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency, as well as on the (starting) position on the 
trade-off, we first have to evaluate the current situation in the Netherlands. In order to do such 
an analysis, we need to clearly define the relevant markets we are examining. In line with 
OPTA, we will distinguish three different markets. These markets will be described below. 
 
Based on European directives, OPTA distinguishes three relevant markets within the provision 
of broadband through the copper infrastructure. The first relevant market is the market for 
unbundled access. More precisely, it refers to the market for unbundled access (including 
shared access) at the wholesale level to metal networks in order to provide broadband services 
(OPTA 2005b). The supply side of this market consists of metal network owners (usually 
KPN), whereas so-called DSL-platform holders, such as BBned, Versatel and Tiscali, but also 
KPN, constitute the demand side. These platform holders are, in turn, suppliers in the second 
relevant market in broadband. On these markets, wholesale broadband access is traded. 
Wholesale broadband access is the product that a network owner delivers to a service provider. 
Besides the DSL-platform holders mentioned above, other (cable) companies such as UPC, 
Essent and Casema offer wholesale broadband access as well. By means of wholesale 
broadband access, internet service providers, such as Zonnet, Wanadoo or XS4ALL offer 
broadband access to the end-users. This constitutes the third relevant market.   18 
 
OPTA analyzed these markets and concluded that KPN has a dominant position in the market 
for unbundled access as well as in the market for high quality wholesale broadband access. In 
these markets, demand substitutability, supply substitutability as well as the level of potential 
competition are considered to be too low to leave these markets unregulated. Therefore, KPN is 
obliged to give access to its network to competing platform holders against regulated prices. 
 
Having defined the relevant markets in broadband, we now return to the question whether a 
trade-off exists between static and dynamic efficiency. We assess the current level of static and 
dynamic efficiency in the relevant broadband markets and determine the impact of regulation. 
Table 6.1, summarizing the main findings of this chapter, shows that in two markets, i.e. the 
market for unbundled access to the local loop and the market for high quality wholesale access, 
a trade-off exists between static efficiency and dynamic efficiency. In the market for low 
quality wholesale access a modest trade-off between static efficiency and dynamic efficiency 
can be found. This is due to the fixed costs associated with investments in infrastructure on the 
on the one hand and uncertainty about future revenues caused by the fierce competition on the 
other. In the last market, i.e. the retail market, a positive relationship exists between the level of 
competition (static efficiency) and innovation (dynamic efficiency). The next sections explain 
these results for each market. 
Table 6.1  Efficiency states relevant markets 
Relevant market in broadband  Regulated  Static Efficiency  Dynamic Efficiency  Trade-off 
Unbundled access to the local loop  Yes  Medium  Medium  Yes 
High quality wholesale access  Yes  Medium  Medium  Yes 
Low quality wholesale access  No  High  Medium  Modest 
Retail access  No  High  High  No 
 
6.2  The market for unbundled access 
Without regulation, this market is bound to be statically inefficient. With no substitutability on 
both the demand side and the supply side, allocative efficiency will be low due to high access 
prices and anti-competitive practices (such as delaying collocation and unbundling requests). 
Furthermore, x-inefficiencies may well exist. Although in theory a monopolist would gain from 
reducing x-inefficiencies, in practice the lack of competition usually reduces the incentives to 
maximize productive efficiency. 
 
Dynamic efficiency, however, is expected to be high. As this market is a typical natural 
monopoly, an innovator will be able to fully reap the benefits of a successful innovation. A 
radical innovation in this market would be the replacement of the local loop by another local   19 
loop
17 (increasing the capacity of the existing local loop is an innovation in another market, 
namely the market for broadband access). Provided that the new local loop is indeed 
economically profitable (in the sense that the private revenues will outweigh the private costs), 
either an entrant or the incumbent will roll out the new network of local loops. Due to the high 
fixed and sunk costs associated with this, duplication by other suppliers will not arise. 
Therefore, the first supplier to roll out a new local loop infrastructure will be able to appropriate 
all rents. Other possible innovations in this market are generally far less radical. Here, one can 
think of organizational and operational improvements related to the physical unbundling 
process, network maintenance, as well as billing and account management. But the same 
principle applies: the (unregulated) innovator can fully reap the benefits of these innovations. 
Although an incumbent will have weaker incentives to do so, the threat of entry can be 
sufficient to make an incumbent innovative. 
 
In short, without regulation, the market for unbundled access will be statically inefficient, but 
dynamically efficient. However, for a number of years the local (copper) loop has been subject 
to access regulation by OPTA. The key question now is whether the way the local loop is 
regulated affects the development of alternative infrastructures and other innovations. As 
mentioned, lower access tariffs, albeit good for static efficiency, generally reduces the 
appropriability of profits due to innovation. 
 
Initially, a scheme with rising access prices was pursued by OPTA. At first, access prices were 
based on historical costs. Then, access prices would gradually rise to the level of actual costs. 
The initially low access prices encouraged firms to enter the market for wholesale broadband 
access by rolling out their own backbone networks and connecting these networks to local loops 
rented from KPN. However, these low access prices did not encourage the rolling-out of 
alternative local loops by other firms, because access tariffs were presumably below the actual 
average cost. The gradual rise of access prices up to the level of actual costs was meant to 
overcome this. If a potential entrant would expect that his costs will be lower than the actual 
costs of KPN, this would encourage him to roll out his own network of local loops. This, in 
turn, would discipline KPN to lower its actual costs to the lowest possible level. 
 
This latter effect clearly emerged in the market for unbundled access. Access prices have in fact 
declined, indicating that actual costs have fallen below the level of historical cost.
18 The 
prevailing method of access pricing, based on actual costs, seems nevertheless dynamically 
efficient, as it gives both the incumbents and entrants incentives to invest in the local loop. 
 
17 However, if this new loop is not made of metal, but, e.g. fiber, the new infrastructure will not fall under the current definition 
of the market for unbundled access. 
18 Note that this decline in average costs can be due to incremental innovations, but also to a reduction of x-inefficiencies 
and increasing economies of scale.   20 
Entrants will only invest in an alternative infrastructure if that is more efficient than using the 
network of the incumbent. Otherwise, this ‘make-or-buy’ decision which (potential) entrants 
face stimulates the incumbent to improve efficiency and performance of its own local loop. 
Although post-innovation profits will be lower due to regulation, the innovator will at least be 
able to recover its costs. Consequently, the current regulation of the local loop does not bias the 
investment decisions of both incumbents and (potential) entrants.
19 Formally, it does have a 
negative impact on static efficiency, because the access price is above the level of marginal 
costs. However, given the high level of fixed costs, marginal cost pricing would probably imply 
that the incumbent will not be able to recover its fixed costs. Therefore, prices based on average 
costs seem to be a good compromise between static and dynamic efficiency. 
 
In the future, additional incentives for improving efficiency of the existing local loop may come 
from competition from other infrastructures, in particular cable but also wireless.
20 As such a 
development would alter the relevant market of unbundled access, regulation might be less 
needed to balance and/or stimulate static and dynamic efficiency. But under present market 
conditions, access tariffs based on actual costs increase static efficiency, but still give entrants 
as well as the incumbent sufficient incentives to improve the network of local loops. 
6.3  The market for wholesale broadband access 
Without unbundled access to the local loop, each platform holder would need to have its own 
local loop network in order to offer broadband access. Given that a local loop network is a 
typical natural monopoly, static efficiency would be low in the wholesale market as well. 
Similarly, without unbundled access dynamic efficiency would be high, given the favourable 
appropriability conditions. However, unbundled access regulation exists nowadays. How does 
this affect static and dynamic efficiency in the market for wholesale internet access? 
 
As mentioned, the unbundling of the local loop combined with the relatively low access tariffs 
and no unbundling of the higher parts (bitstream) of the network have contributed to 
investments in alternative backbone infrastructures (OPTA, 2005). The first measure (ULL and 
low access tariffs) provided potential competitors with a guaranteed option to use the existing 
local loop against relatively favourable conditions while the latter measure forced those firms to 
invest in own backbone networks. Consequently, infrastructure competition in higher parts of 
the network has emerged in the Netherlands. Currently, DSL Platform holders own 
approximately five different backbone infrastructures. 
 
19 From this respect, the regulation of OPTA can be called technology neutral (see OPTA, 2005b). 
20 At present, however, these incentives are not very strong, because both cable and wireless are no feasible substitutes in 
the market for unbundled access (OPTA, 2005b).    21 
 
The analysis of this market by OPTA shows that the market for wholesale broadband access in 
practice consists of two separate relevant markets. The distinguishing feature between these two 
markets is the contention ratio (in Dutch: overboekingsfactor), i.e., the ratio of guaranteed and 
maximal band width. The level of contention determines which services can be offered at the 
retail level. In particular data communication services, mainly used by firms to connect their 
different offices by means of a closed network, require high levels of overbooking. OPTA 
concludes that the relevant market for wholesale broadband access with a contention ratio of 
1:20 or higher (high quality) is different than the market with contention lower than 1:20 (low 
quality). 
Low quality access 
Over the last ten to fifteen years, several firms have invested rather heavily in new network 
capacity.
21 As the costs of these investments are, within reasonable boundaries, hardly 
influenced by the size of the cables, firms chose to roll out backbones with very large (spare) 
capacities.
22 As a large amount of capacity is not yet utilised, supply is determined by short run 
marginal costs. As a consequence, static efficiency is high at this moment.
23 
 
The capacity of existing networks is constantly being enhanced by technological developments 
in communication equipment. For instance, by using different colours of light in stead of only 
one, many more light signals can be transported over the existing glass fibre networks. For the 
near future, investments in new wholesale capacity will hence not be hindered by large sunk 
costs. Therefore, as long as the existing (spare) capacity and developments in transportation 
equipment are sufficient to meet demand, dynamic efficiency will also be high. 
 
This leads us to conclude that now and in the near future, both static and dynamic efficiency are 
high in the market for low quality wholesale access. Only in the long run, when e.g. a 
completely new technology will require significant investments, the trade-off between static and 
dynamic efficiency may alter. 
High quality access 
Providing data communication services, the most important retail market for high quality 
broadband access, requires a national network. As KPN is the only firm with such a network, 
 
21 And continue to do so (see OPTA 2005c). 
22 Overoptimistic expectations regarding future demand may also explain this. 
23 One may wonder whether the current situation is sustainable. Some suppliers have made substantial losses. If this 
continues to be the case, firms may even exit this market. It is, however, unlikely that this will eventually lead to substantial 
market power for the remaining firms (and hence low static efficiency). After all, given the level of fixed costs relative to 
demand, this market is not a typical natural monopoly.   22 
and duplication of this network is not economically feasible, KPN has a dominant position in 
the market for high quality wholesale access. For this reason, KPN has to grant access to its 
network against reasonable conditions. As this situation closely resembles current market 
conditions in the market for unbundled access, we derive the same conclusions here regarding 
static and dynamic efficiency. Due to current regulation, static efficiency is increased, but 
sufficient incentives remain for entrants and incumbents to improve the network. 
6.4  The market for retail broadband access 
Retail broadband access basically consists of two different services: transmission and internet-
connectivity. Often these two services are provided by one and the same supplier. Both the 
cable network and the copper local loops are apt for offering retail broadband access. 
 
In absence of regulation, in particular the unbundling of the local loop, the retail market for 
broadband access would be statically inefficient. The retail market for high quality would, in 
that case, even be monopolized, as KPN is the only wholesale supplier. KPN would set its 
wholesale access prices so high that potential entrants to the retail market would not be able to 
compete with KPN’s (or a subsidiary) retail business. KPN would then also be the only supplier 
of high quality retail broadband access, leading to a statically inefficient market. 
 
In the low quality segment of the retail market, cable companies also offer retail broadband 
access. If upstream regulation was absent, we would hence have two independent suppliers of 
retail broadband access in most regions. This, however, does not mean that static efficiency 
would be high. In particular KPN would still have substantial market power. The reason for this 
is that end users perceive the quality of internet access through cable inferior to internet through 
DSL networks (see OPTA 2005a). Although this does not give KPN monopoly power, still we 
can expect that prices would be substantially higher than marginal costs. Hence, static 
efficiency would be low in a retail market without regulation in the upstream market. 
 
But, as explained above, due to regulation the market for low quality wholesale broadband 
access has become quite competitive.
24 This, combined with the low entry barriers in retail 
broadband access, has led to high levels of static efficiency in the retail market. Dozens of 
independent providers are active now, offering many different types of competing 
subscriptions. 
 
24 This process was obviously stimulated by the fact that cable networks have become apt for communication services rather 
than just for the transmission of radio and television.   23 
 
Does this negatively affect dynamic efficiency? The answer is no, because the costs of 
introducing new retail services is rather low (compared to demand). It mainly involves new 
services related to internet-connectivity. Both these activities do not require monopoly profits. 
 
In conclusion, predominantly due to regulation in the upstream market, the market for retail 
broadband access is statically and dynamically efficient. 
7  Concluding remarks 
In this memorandum, we assessed the impact of regulation on the deployment of broadband. 
We first defined the characteristics of the telecommunications industry and the regulation for 
this industry. Afterwards, we looked into the regulation in a number of countries showing a 
relatively strongly developed broadband market. Finally, we analyzed how regulation affects 
the deployment of broadband, in particular in the Netherlands. 
 
Contrary to other network industries, the telecommunications industry is more and more 
characterized by several, competing networks, such as cable, copper, and wireless. Ongoing 
technological developments enhance this competition. Each of these networks shows network 
externalities and economies of scale. As a result of the existence of competing infrastructures, 
the essential-facility character of the current networks is declining. In this respect, the 
telecommunications industry is becoming a less typical network industry compared to, for 
instance, the electricity industry. In the future, however, if a single superior transportation 
technology would emerge, the essential-facility component could become more important 
again.  
 
The key issue of regulation of access to a network is dealing with the trade-off between static 
efficiency and dynamic efficiency. Favourable conditions for access to the network contribute 
to allocative efficiency and productive efficiency but can negatively affect incentives for 
investments in upgrading of existing infrastructures and developing new ones. Governments in 
the different countries, such as South Korea, Canada, Sweden and the Netherlands, made 
several similar policy decisions. All privatized the formerly state-owned incumbent 
telecommunications firms. Only Sweden still shows a rather strong state share in this industry. 
Moreover, South Korea as well as Canada imposed restrictions on foreign ownership. Many 
countries introduced unbundling of the existing local loop, but some countries, such as the 
United States, have given exemptions to investments in alternative infrastructures. 
   24 
In the Netherlands, regulation of the telecommunication industry is designed to enhance 
competition between alternative infrastructures without affecting the technology choice of both 
incumbents and entrants. Based on European directives, OPTA (the Dutch telecom regulator) 
distinguishes three relevant markets within the provision of broadband through the copper 
infrastructure: the market for unbundled access, the market for wholesale broadband access and 
the retail market. The market for unbundled access and a part of the market for wholesale 
access, i.e. the high-quality market, are regulated. The impact of regulation on the deployment 
of broadband depends on how the key issue of regulation, i.e. dealing with both static and 
dynamic efficiency, is solved. Here we summarize the conclusions for each of these markets: 
 
·  In two markets, i.e. the market for unbundled access to the local loop and the market for high 
quality wholesale access, a trade-off exists between static efficiency and dynamic efficiency. 
This trade-off is due to the presence of the fixed costs of the infrastructure. Tariffs for access to 
the local loop reflect (average) actual costs of the existing copper infrastructure, giving entrants 
incentives to make efficient make-or-buy decisions. In addition, the threat of infrastructure 
competition in the local loop as well as the service-base competition between providers using 
different infrastructures, i.e. copper and cable, are incentives for the incumbent to increase 
efficiency. Consequently, the current regulation of the local loop does not bias the investment 
decisions of both incumbents and (potential) entrants. Formally, it does have a negative impact 
on static efficiency, because the access price is above the level of marginal costs. However, 
given the high level of fixed costs, marginal cost pricing would probably imply that the 
incumbent will not be able to recover its fixed costs. Therefore, prices based on average costs 
seem to be a good compromise between static and dynamic efficiency.  
 
·  An analogue conclusion holds for the high-quality part of the wholesale access market.  This 
market closely resembles current market conditions in the market for unbundled access. Due to 
current regulation of this market, static efficiency is increased, but sufficient incentives remain 
for entrants and incumbents to improve the network 
 
·  In the market for low-quality wholesale access, a trade-off between static and dynamic 
efficiency does not exists. Competition has led to considerable investments in glass fibre 
backbones to such an extent that there is large overcapacity of these networks at present. 
Consequently, static efficiency is high. Further, the costs of deploying existing spare capacity 
are rather modest. Hence, investments in new capacity do not require high investments, which 
is good for dynamic efficiency. 
   25 
·  In the last market, i.e. the retail market, a positive relationship exists between the level of 
competition (static efficiency) and innovation (dynamic efficiency). This market appears to be 
both statically and dynamically efficient.  
 
Our overall conclusion is that Dutch regulation of the telecommunication industry gives 
efficient incentives for technological development such as the deployment of broadband.   26 
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